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The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws 
Eric A. Posner,1 Richard Hynes,2 and Anup Malani3 
September 19, 2001 
Every state has laws that protect some of the assets of debtors from the satisfaction 
of claims by creditors. These “property exemption laws,” which are also called 
“bankruptcy exemptions,” have long and important political histories. Texas entered the 
union as the first state with property exemptions—designed, it was said at the time, to 
draw settlers from other states—but the southern states responded quickly with 
exemptions of their own, and today every state has property exemptions, frequently 
quite generous. Like usury, stay, and currency laws, exemption laws have played an 
important role in the perennial conflict between debtors and creditors. 
Exemption laws also play an important role in federal bankruptcy law, and it is here 
that they enjoy a higher profile. The treatment of state property exemptions in the 
federal bankruptcy code of 1978 resulted from a compromise between the House, which 
sought to establish a mandatory system of federal exemptions, and the Senate, which 
sought to incorporate state exemption laws as the older bankruptcy law did. The 
compromise law established a set of federal exemptions, and permitted debtors to 
choose between the federal exemptions and the exemptions of the state in which they 
reside, unless that state had by statute “opted out” of the federal system, in which case 
the debtors would have to choose that state’s exemptions. Feelings about exemptions 
were strong enough in 1978 that this compromise almost did not occur, and they persist 
today.4 Recent efforts to amend the federal bankruptcy law have foundered over, among 
other issues, the question of whether state exemptions should be capped by a federal 
ceiling. 
Property exemptions are important because of their role in the regulation of 
consumer credit, and the light they shed on the federal relationship between the states 
and the national government. But they are poorly understood. Exemptions are a puzzle 
for economists because, like usury laws, they restrict credit markets in the absence of a 
well-defined market failure to which they would be a suitable response. Studies of the 
impact of exemptions on credit markets show effects of ambiguous value; while 
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exemption laws may provide some insurance against income shocks, they increase the 
cost of credit, particularly for the poor.5 
To understand how exemption laws work, imagine that a creditor lends $1,000 to a 
debtor, and that the debtor defaults on the loan. Under ordinary contract principles, the 
creditor could sue the debtor for breach of contract, obtain a judgment, and then have a 
local official seize assets of the debtor, which would be sold with the proceeds going to 
the creditor to the extent of its claim. Suppose that the debtor’s only valuable asset is an 
automobile worth $2,000, and the relevant property exemption law says that a debtor’s 
automobile is an exempt asset up to a value of $2,500. Then the local official would 
refuse to liquidate the creditor’s claim by seizing the automobile. The creditor’s claim 
would continue to be valid, and the creditor could enforce it against any nonexempt 
assets that the debtor might subsequently obtain. The creditor would in most states be 
able to garnish a portion of the debtor’s wages. But the automobile would be safe.  
A debtor cannot agree to waive exemption laws in return for a lower interest rate: 
like usury laws exemption laws supply mandatory, rather than default, rules. However, 
exemption laws can sometimes be circumvented, albeit imperfectly, through security 
interests and other arrangements. If, in our example, the creditor had obtained a security 
interest in the automobile when it lent the $1,000 to the debtor, default would give the 
creditor the right to seize the automobile and sell it in satisfaction of its claim. 
Exemption laws operate the same way in bankruptcy (under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the dominant form of bankruptcy for consumers) as they do outside 
of bankruptcy. If the debtor in our first example files for bankruptcy, then his nonexempt 
assets would be liquidated with the proceeds divided among all of his unsecured 
creditors. If the debtor owns a painting worth $200 (in addition to the car), and the state 
property exemption law does not refer to paintings or other goods of which a painting 
might be a kind, then the painting is a nonexempt asset. The trustee could sell the 
painting but not the car, and the $200 would be distributed to the creditors. In addition, 
in bankruptcy the debtor can discharge the unsatisfied portion of the creditor’s claim, so 
the creditor would not be able to seize nonexempt assets that the debtor subsequently 
obtains. The debtor remains roughly as vulnerable to secured creditors in bankruptcy as 
outside bankruptcy; if a creditor has a security interest in the car, the debtor could retain 
the automobile only if the creditor were repaid in full.6 
There are numerous complications, many of which will be discussed below, but the 
examples above provide a basic picture of state property exemption laws. Their purpose 
and apparent effect are to restrict the ability of creditors to satisfy unpaid debts. 
Many scholars have tried to explain the effect of exemption laws on behavior—
including lending practices and the bankruptcy filing7—but, despite the absence of an 
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intuitive theory explaining the market failure for which exemptions would be the 
solution, no one has tried to explain why states create exemption laws in the first place. 
This paper begins to fill this gap. We investigate the political determinants of exemption 
laws, using as data the exemption laws in the fifty states between 1975 and 1996. 
We take two basic approaches to these data. First, we exploit the opt-out provision 
of the Bankruptcy Code, which confronted states with a stark choice between 
acquiescing in the usually more generous federal personal property exemptions, or 
opting out and preserving their own. By examining how states reacted, we can discover 
some of the factors that influence their exemption choice and discover some of the 
motivation for Congress to pass a statute with an opt-out provision.8 
Second, we test the various exemption theories by regressing the exemption levels—
across states and over time—on independent variables identified by theory. This 
approach enables us to use more data than the opt-out approach does (which is 
essentially cross-sectional), but it also involves us in econometric difficulties that we 
describe below. 
Using these approaches, we test theories of exemption laws that have been 
proposed in the literature, or that are suggested by anecdotal evidence. The theories 
break down into public interest theories, according to which exemption laws are a crude 
form of social insurance, and public choice theories, according to which exemption laws 
are designed to pay off interest groups. We also examine the influence of history, 
ideology, and perennial worries about the bankruptcy filing rate. 
Our paper begins with the historical background, which provides our motivation 
for testing various hypotheses. Part II describes and explains these hypotheses. Part III 
presents our empirical results. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History 
Laws that enable debtors to avoid paying creditors extend back to Biblical times. 
There are important precursors of American state exemption laws in the English 
common law, some of which persist today. For example, some states allow married 
debtors to shield property held in the form of tenancy by the entirety from creditors of 
only one spouse. But recognizable property exemption laws did not appear in the 
United States until the middle of the nineteenth century. The first exemption law was 
adopted by the (then) Republic of Texas in 1839 and was expanded when Texas became 
a state in 1845. Many other states followed suit in the 1840s and 1850s. By the end of the 
1860s almost every state had adopted a homestead exemption law. These laws either 
specified a dollar amount of equity in property or an area in acres or town lots. The 
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exemptions ranged from $200 to $5,000,9 and from one quarter of an acre of farmland or 
a lot in a town to as many as 160 acres of farmland.10 
The first laws set a pattern which prevails today, although the nominal values of 
exemptions have increased considerably. States make a basic distinction between 
homestead exemptions, which protect real property, and exemptions that protect 
personal property.11 Homestead exemptions usually list dollar amounts, but sometimes 
refer to particular acreage limits that may vary depending on whether the land is in a 
town or a rural area. In the past, some exemptions could be waived if the owner (and 
sometimes his spouse) signed a waiver, or filed with a registry, but this is now 
prohibited by federal law, except with regard to secured credit.12 Personal property 
exemptions usually list specific kinds of property, with individual and/or aggregate 
dollar ceilings, but sometimes allow the debtor to choose the property he will exempt. 
Personal property exemptions often refer to categories of basic necessities, like food, 
clothes, furnishings or tools of trade, but sometimes they refer to specific items, like 
herds of sheep or military uniforms. Exemption levels may vary depending on whether 
the debtor is the head of a household or is single, the debtor is a veteran or not, and the 
debtor is elderly or not. 
In 1898 the federal government created the first durable bankruptcy law. The federal 
law incorporated state bankruptcy exemptions. This meant that if an individual filed for 
bankruptcy under federal law, he could (1) obtain a discharge from all or most of his 
debts, and (2) keep whatever assets were exempted under the law of the state in which 
he resided. The federal bankruptcy system did not replace state debt collection laws so 
much as supplement them. A debtor could choose to enter bankruptcy or not; if he did 
not, his creditors could sue him for unpaid debts but still could not liquidate his exempt 
assets. In 1978 the federal government replaced the old bankruptcy system with the 
current bankruptcy system. The House tried to replace state exemptions with a uniform 
system of federal exemptions, while the Senate sought to maintain the old system of 
federal incorporation of state exemptions.13 The compromise was a law that set forth 
uniform federal exemptions and held that a debtor could choose between the federal 
exemptions and his state’s exemptions, except in those states that formally opt out of the 
federal system, where debtors must use local exemption laws. About two-thirds of the 
states had opted out by the early 1980s. 
The bankruptcy filing rate had been rising gradually through the 1960s and the 
1970s, but after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 the filing rate 
increased markedly. Currently, more than a million people file for bankruptcy every 
year. Some commentators have blamed the increase on the generosity of state and 
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federal exemption laws, but the evidence is conflicting.14 It is true that the federal 
exemptions created by the 1978 Act were higher than many state exemptions at the time. 
However, the federal exemptions were not available in the states that opted out of the 
federal system; the federal exemptions were actually reduced in 1984; the federal 
exemptions were not adjusted for inflation until 1994; and most states did not increase 
their exemptions faster than inflation after 1978 (though many did). Yet all this time the 
bankruptcy filing rate increased steadily across states. 
Despite the lack of evidence of a connection between the bankruptcy filing rate and 
the Bankruptcy Code or property exemptions, concerns about the default rate and the 
bankruptcy filing rate have provoked calls for reform of the Bankruptcy Code, including 
a provision that requires many wealthier debtors to file under Chapter 13. Another 
popular reform is to cap exemptions so that states can no longer provide generous relief 
to the wealthiest debtors, but this could hardly be expected to affect the filing rate, 
because very few debtors who have valuable assets file for bankruptcy. 
A separate concern is that state property exemptions are not sufficiently generous, 
and that the vary too much across states. Many state property exemption laws have 
archaic provisions that are unchanged since the nineteenth century. In Oklahoma, for 
example, the debtor can exempt a gun, twenty head of sheep, and “all provisions and 
forage on hand.”15 Commentators assume that state legislatures must not care enough 
about exemptions to update them, justifying a federal role. Although, as we will see, 
these concerns are exaggerated, the debate reflects the important role of federalism in 
bankruptcy policy.16 
B. A first look at exemptions 
Exemption laws are complex, and pose difficult coding issues, but at this stage it is 
appropriate to give the reader a sense of their variation between states and over time. 
Table 1 shows the nominal personal and homestead exemptions for all states in 1975 
and 1996—the first and last years of our period. Roughly speaking, a homeowner can 
take advantage of both sets of exemptions; a nonhomeowner can take advantage only of 
the personal property exemptions though in many states nonhomeowners can use a 
portion of the homeowner exemption for personal property. Significantly, 
nonhomeowners were able to use the entire amount of the federal homestead exemption 
toward personal property until 1984. Table 1 also shows the growth rate of homestead 
exemptions; which states allowed a particularly strong form of tenancy by the entirety, 
“TBE,” in 1975 (only Ohio and Massachusetts dropped this doctrine before 1996); and 
which states opt out of the federal exemptions, and when. 
[Table 1: Nominal Homestead and Personal Property Exemptions] 
Consider a married couple who have $30,000 equity in their house; a $20,000 car; 
and a $10,000 art collection. Assume further that they have no joint creditors. Both the 
homestead exemptions and the doctrine of tenancy by the entirety can be used to protect 
                                                 
14 For a survey of this literature, see Hynes and Posner, supra note __. 
15 31 Okl. St. § 1 (2000) . 
16 For a discussion of exemption policy and federalism, see G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption 
Reform, 74 Am. Bankr. L.J. 227 (2000). 
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the home equity; almost all states have general personal property exemptions that can be 
used for cars as well as other property, or else a specific motor vehicle exemption. The 
debtors could keep the art collection if their state has a generous personal property 
exemption that is not restricted to, say, cars, furniture, and clothes, but would have no 
luck if it did not. 
In 1975, the debtors could keep $19,000 of equity (with $11,000 to the unsecured 
creditors) if they lived in Alaska; the entire house if they live in Hawaii; the entire house 
if they lived in Indiana (though only $1,400 if they jointly owed their obligations); and so 
forth; and $0 of equity in New Jersey. In 1996, the debtors could keep the whole house in 
Alaska, Hawaii, and Indiana ($15,000 if the obligations were jointly owed); and the 
whole house in New Jersey because they could now claim the federal exemption. 
Figure 1 provides a geographic perspective on nominal homestead exemptions. The 
states marked with “pins” have unlimited exemptions; the darker states have higher 
nominal exemptions than the lighter states. One perceives a regional pattern: the 
unlimited states form a belt up the middle of the country; Midwestern and western 
states have more generous homestead exemptions than southern and eastern states. This 
pattern holds up over time, but is less distinct for personal property exemptions. 
[Figure 1: Homestead exemptions in 1996] 
A glance back at Table 1 confirms the considerable cross-sectional variation in the 
nominal value of homestead and personal property exemptions in 1975 and 1996. The 
fourth column shows that homestead exemptions generally grew slowly, and on average 
much less than inflation; this is true for personal property exemptions as well. Figure 2 
shows variation over time of the mean nominal value of the exemptions that could be 
claimed by a homeowner, and also the exemptions for two states, Alabama and 
California 
[Figure 2: Nominal exemptions over time] 
Visual inspection of the data and simple means and growth rates thus reveals (1) 
some regional patterns; (2) rising nominal exemptions (with a few ambiguous exceptions 
states do not lower their nominal exemptions) that are nonetheless eroded by inflation in 
most states; (3) the federal homestead exemption roughly equal to the median state 
homestead exemption in 1978, and the federal personal property exemptions greater 
than most state personal property exemptions (especially if one includes the ability of 
nonhomeowners to use the federal homestead exemption); and (4) considerable 
variation in dollar exemption levels across time and across states: in some state-years a 
couple can exempt virtually nothing, in others tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars 
worth of property. This last observation alerts us that subtle variations across states—
risk preferences, for example, or income per capita—are unlikely to explain much 
variation in exemption levels. 
II. HYPOTHESES 
A. Federalism and opt out 
We begin with the opt-out decision because it is the cleanest test of the sensitivity of 
state exemption laws to external events. As we will see below, our tests of the levels of 
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exemptions are hindered by the difficulty of measuring the independent variables and 
the fact that our explanatory variables exhibit little variation. 
By contrast, in 1979 the Bankruptcy Code confronted many states with a stark 
choice: accept a dramatically higher exemption regime or enact legislation to opt out. At 
the same time, some states had high enough exemptions already that the federal scheme 
did not pose any dilemmas. It might seem odd that the federal government would pass a 
law on a topic that the states have already considered and then allow each state to revert 
to its own judgment. However, this approach is not uncommon; it has been employed 
with regard to usury laws, banking regulation, and other areas of the law.17 
 We assume that prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, state exemption laws 
reflected a political equilibrium. Some people probably wanted more generous 
exemption laws, and other people wanted stricter laws, but no one had the political 
power to change the status quo. The Bankruptcy Code served as an external shock, for it 
increased the nonhomeowner exemptions in most states unless they opted out. 
If the existing state exemptions reflected a political equilibrium, one might predict 
that all states would opt out, and reestablish the old equilibrium. But this prediction 
ignores the possibility that the new status quo created by the Bankruptcy Code increases 
the political power of actors within the state who prefer a higher exemption level. Some 
states might not opt out because these actors have enough political power to block such 
a move. One might also predict that states that are already more generous than the 
federal government would not bother to opt out. But this ignores the difficulty of 
comparing federal and state exemptions (as we discuss below) and ideological aversion 
to federal interference. Still, one might argue that in general, states with stingy 
exemptions are more likely to opt out than states with generous exemptions. 
Extending the argument that enactment of the Bankruptcy Code upset local political 
equilibria, one predicts that if a state’s exemptions are lower than the federal 
exemptions, that state is likely to increase its exemptions when it opts out, though not 
above the federal level. The increase in the exemption is necessary to “bribe” those who 
would otherwise block attempts to opt out because they prefer the more generous 
federal exemptions. If the state exemptions are higher, the federal exemptions do not 
change the status quo, and so adjustment of state exemptions would be unnecessary. We 
thus predict the upon opting out a state with exemptions lower than the federal 
exemptions will raise its exemptions to an amount between its status quo level and the 
federal level. We call this prediction the “bargain theory.” 
We would not necessarily predict that other independent variables would play a 
role; these are already reflected in the status quo exemptions. However, conservative or 
populist states might object to federal interference even if it is symbolic.18 Existing work 
on the bankruptcy filing rate, and some anecdotal evidence, also suggest that states with 
higher bankruptcy filing rates will be more eager to opt out, for the federal exemptions 
were widely seen as likely to increase the attractiveness of bankruptcy. In addition, it is 
                                                 
17 See supra note __. 
18 For evidence of the influence of ideology on bankruptcy policy, especially in the nineteenth century, see Erik Berglöf 
and Howard Rosenthal, The Political Economy of American Bankruptcy: The Evidence from Roll Call Voting, 1800–1978 
(manuscript, 1999). 
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possible that legislatures in states with very low exemptions just did not care enough 
about the issue to opt out.19  
B. Exemption levels: Public interest hypotheses 
Legislators, judges, and commentators have since the beginning advanced a series 
of stock explanations for exemptions. These explanations center around their usefulness 
for cushioning debtors against economic shocks such as depressions, helping people 
who have fallen onto hard times, and protecting the family from the improvidence of the 
head of household. 
Whatever the truth these explanations had in the nineteenth century, when capital 
markets were thinner, secured credit was less common, more people were self-sufficient 
farmers, and the family was a more important unit of economic activity, they have less 
resonance today. Nevertheless, we make an effort to test them (except the third, which 
we do not consider). To clarify discussion, we recast these arguments in terms of the 
standard justifications economists give for social assistance programs: insurance and 
altruism.20 
1. Exemptions as credit insurance. 
A credit contract can, in theory, insure the debtor against bad states of the world as 
well as provide for an interest rate that he pays in the good state. In a perfect market, a 
firm that supplies both credit and such insurance would offer a menu of interest rates 
and default terms, and debtors would choose among them on the basis of their risk 
preference, wealth, and so forth. This is more than a mere academic possibility. There is 
a developed, if heavily criticized, market in credit insurance in which debtors can 
purchase insurance against default on the occurrence of certain events such as disability 
and unemployment. Moreover, a debtor can protect himself from default by purchasing 
insurance against events that often provoke default, events such as illness and 
destruction of property. 
However, insurance markets might be imperfect, and it is possible that neither the 
creditor nor a third party insurer would supply an insurance term. On this view, 
exemption laws solve a market failure by requiring creditors to supply the terms that 
would be offered in a perfect market, much as a mandatory warranty law could solve 
the lemons problem in, say, the used car industry.21 If this is so, then one might predict 
that the level of exemptions should depend on the factors that would affect an 
individual’s choice of credit insurance in a perfect market. For example, individuals who 
                                                 
19 One might also predict that the independent variables would be correlated with the timing of opt out; we discuss this 
prediction in note __, below. 
20 See, for example, Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 Amer. Econ. Rev. 542, 
543 (1969). 
21 See, for example, Hung-Jen Wang and Michelle J. White, An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure and Proposed 
Reforms, 29 J. Legal Stud. 255 (2000); R. Dye, An Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Statutes, 24 Econ. Inquiry 417 (1986); S. 
Rea, Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 Econ. Inquiry 188 (1984); Thomas Jackson, The Logic 
and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986). 
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are more risk averse, who are wealthier, or who face greater risks might demand larger 
exemptions.22 
 There are formidable difficulties with this theory on its own terms, and there are a 
number of difficulties with testing it. 
First, the nature of the failure in credit markets is obscure. Cognitive biases, high 
transaction costs, and adverse selection are trotted out from time to time, but it is not 
clear that mandatory exemptions would solve these problems. Moreover, the various 
theories are indeterminate in their prescriptions, and make strong demands on the 
capacity of legislators and judges to choose optimal laws.23 We think it sufficient for the 
purpose of our paper, however, to assume that legislators believe that the market fails to 
provide wanted insurance, and for this reason enact exemption laws. 
Second, the availability of other forms of insurance, including social insurance, may 
vary significantly across states and across time. These alternative forms of insurance 
serve not only as proxies for the demand for insurance, but also as substitutes for 
exemptions, dampening the predicted relationship between the demand for insurance 
and exemption laws. 
Third, it is difficult to translate a theory of the individual debtor’s demand for 
exemptions as insurance into a theory of the level of exemptions required by the state 
legislature. We have to add a theory that translates individual demand into state-level 
demand for insurance. One might employ a variant of the median voter theorem and 
assume that the level of exemptions reflects the default insurance demanded by the 
average person in the state. However, the very rich may not care at all about exemptions 
because they can self-insure; to the extent they borrow at all, their lenders are nearly 
certain to be repaid and will therefore not “charge” them for the exemptions.24 
Therefore, the preference of these individuals is likely to be indeterminate or depend on 
further assumptions such as the likelihood of tort suits. 
For these reasons, we are skeptical as a theoretical matter that an insurance theory 
can explain interstate and temporal variation of exemptions. At best, the insurance 
theory can explain in a general sense why exemptions might exist, or why legislatures 
might think that they are a good idea. Nonetheless, we test the theory against our data 
set. 
 2. Altruism 
Under the altruism (or merit goods) theory, individuals derive utility from their 
own consumption and the consumption of others. This assumption is commonly used in 
                                                 
22 One might also expect exemption laws to be enacted during downturns; but unlike stay laws, exemption laws usually 
persist indefinitely through good times and bad. For evidence that stay laws and pro-debtor federal bankruptcy 
legislation are countercyclical, see Ian Domowitz and Elie Tamer, Two Hundred Years of Bankruptcy: A Tale of Legislation 
and Economic Fluctuations (unpublished manuscript, undated). 
23 See Posner and Hynes, supra note __. 
24 This is somewhat consistent with the empirical research on exemptions which finds that the adverse effects on credit 
supply are much more pronounced for low-asset debtors than high-asset debtors. See Gropp, Scholz & White, supra note 
____ at 234. 
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empirical articles on the political determinants of welfare policy.25 Although taxation and 
welfare are sometimes thought the most efficient way to transfer funds,26 they also create 
perverse incentives. If people know that welfare will rescue them, they engage in overly 
risky borrowing. The attraction of exemption laws is that they allow people who suffer 
income shocks to keep some of their assets, while forcing the creditor to bear the risk of 
default, so the creditor and debtor will be unable to externalize the risk on society.27 
Altruism by itself cannot explain the existence of exemption laws. Altruism implies 
concern for the very poor, but exemption laws help only people who have assets to 
exempt, and most recent variation in state exemption laws protects a level of assets 
vastly in excess of the means of the poor. Further, relatively poor or working class people 
with a few assets are probably hurt by exemption laws because these laws make them 
unattractive credit risks.28 
 An alternative theory is that exemptions respond to a special type of altruism; 
individuals might be more troubled by a decline in their neighbor’s standard of living 
than by the poverty of strangers—a view that is much discussed in the redistribution 
literature.29 For this purpose, exemptions seem well-suited although not perfect. People 
with excessive credit card debt or tort judgments against them can take refuge in the 
exemption laws, although of course these laws do not prevent someone from gambling 
away all his money. Whatever the merits of the altruism theory, it would be difficult to 
distinguish its empirical implications from those of the insurance theory, especially if the 
altruism theory is taken to mean that debtors incur a cost when they see individuals 
similar to themselves suffer. We are accordingly skeptical that the altruism theory can be 
reliably tested. 
C. Exemption levels: Public choice hypotheses 
The public choice hypotheses are based on the theory that exemptions are adopted 
not to solve market failures but to benefit interest groups. As potential interest groups 
that would have an incentive to argue for a deviation from the “optimal” level, we 
consider farmers, lawyers, repeat tort defendants, and secured creditors. In addition, we 
also consider a variant of a “race to the bottom” argument suggested by the literature. 
 1. Competition for migrants 
There is evidence that Texas adopted homestead exemptions in order to attract 
settlers.30 In the mid-nineteenth century Texas had a lot of space, a small population, and 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Robert A. Moffitt, Explaining Welfare Reform: Public Choice and the Labor Market, 6 Inter’l Tax & Pub. 
Finance 289, 298 (1999). 
26 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667. (1994). 
27 See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and 
Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. Legal Stud. 283 (1995). 
28 See Gropp, et al, supra note ___. 
29 See, e.g., Lorenzo Kristov, Peter Lindert, & Robert McClelland, Pressure Groups and Redistribution, 48 J. Pub. Econ. 135, 
146 (1992) (“you care more about the well-being of other people the more they are like yourself”). The authors found 
some evidence for this hypothesis (that transfers are related to what they call “social affinity”) in a pooled time-series 
cross-section regression of 13 countries from 1960-1981, although as they interpret it, it is identical to the insurance 
hypothesis. 
30 Goodman, supra note __. 
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security needs that could be alleviated through migration. The Texas government 
advertised for immigrants, and these advertisements drew attention to the exemptions 
laws in addition to the other charms of the place. Although it is difficult to establish 
causality, Texas’ population rose rapidly over the subsequent decades at the same time 
that Texas developed a reputation as a debtors’ haven. Moreover, it appears that some 
other southern states, such as Alabama, competed for migrants by increasing the 
generosity of their exemptions as well.31 Thus, one theory of the origin of exemption 
laws is that they reflected a competition for migrants. 
One might doubt whether states still compete for absconding debtors in this way. 
However, media accounts describe wealthy debtors such as Bowie Kuhn moving to 
Florida in order to exploit its unlimited homestead exemption,32 and statistical evidence 
suggests that migration flows are correlated with bankruptcy filings,33 and that the size 
of a state’s exemption does affect a debtor’s choice of residence even if this effect is 
weak.34 If exemptions are used as a method of attracting migrants or their investments 
and yet impose some cost on the credit market, one would predict that exemptions are 
up to the point of diminishing returns, negatively correlated with population density. 
 2. Interest groups 
There is historical precedent for the role of interest group politics in setting 
exemption policy. Southern plantation owners supported exemption laws for land but 
not for slaves.35 This may have been a compromise between economically self-sufficient 
landowners who wanted to keep their creditors at bay and slave traders who needed 
credit in order to finance their operations.36 In the modern world, we must look for 
different interest groups. 
Existing Debtors—Farmers. States might raise exemptions to benefit debtors by 
providing them with relief from existing debt. While there was initially some question as 
to whether exemptions would apply retroactively to existing credit contracts,37 it now 
appears settled that they do, at least in bankruptcy.38 It is difficult to believe that debtors 
                                                 
31 Id., pp. 477-78; see also John H. Smyth, The Law of Homestead and Exemption §14 (1875). 
32 See Larry Rohter, Rich Debtors Finding Shelter Under a Populist Florida Law, New York Times, July 25, 1993, at s. 1., p. 
1. 
33 See Margaret F. Brinig and F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. Legal Stud. 201 (1996), which finds evidence 
that states compete for migrants by offering insolvency protection. However, their independent variable is the number of 
bankruptcy filings in a state, rather than the generosity of exemption laws. 
34 Ronel Elul and Narayanan Subramanian, Forum-Shopping and Personal Bankruptcy, Working Paper, July1999. 
35 Goodman, supra note __, p. 480. 
36 However, the broader political conflict appears to have been over exemption laws versus stay laws. In the postbellum 
South, poor farmers sought homestead exemptions, while wealthy plantation owners sought stay laws and debt 
forgiveness. The plantation owners sought more generous laws simply because they had more debt; the poor farmers 
resisted the more generous laws because they could only benefit the rich. Republicans in the South tried to woo the poor 
farmers by promising homestead exemptions. Foner, supra note __, at 326-27. 
37 Whether in fact exemption laws can, or could, be applied retroactively is an extremely tangled area of the law. Cases 
decided before the New Deal generally held that retroactive application is unconstitutional due to the Contracts Clause. 
However, some cases decided since the New Deal have held that retroactive application is constitutional. In any event, in 
political debate people seemed to believe that exemption laws would have retroactive effect. See Foner, supra note __, at 
326-27. It may have been that exemption laws could at best delay creditors while their claims made their way through the 
court system; but this was good enough, in effect, a stay law. Creditors could not be compensated through interest 
payments if debtors were insolvent anyway.  
38 See In Re Weinstein, 164 F.3d 677 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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as a class, dispersed and unorganized, would have much influence on the level of 
exemptions. However, farmers might serve as a cohesive group of debtors that could 
lobby for larger exemptions just as they have lobbied for other forms of legislation, and 
they have a long history of favoring debt relief legislation. Therefore, we expect to find 
that the exemptions are positively correlated with the political power of farmers. 
Lawyers. Bankruptcy and debt-related legal services are a big business. Lawyers earn 
fees whenever they take on clients who want to avoid paying their debts. Because 
exemption laws are an important weapon in the lawyer’s arsenal, lawyers will lobby for 
more generous exemption laws. To be sure, if exemptions laws are too generous, 
creditors will stop extending credit and there will be no debtors seeking legal services. 
In addition, rents will be dissipated as people seek law degrees. But, on the whole, 
lawyers who are experts in debt collection issues would obtain short-term returns from 
the increase in the generosity of exemptions if such exemptions lead to an increase in 
filings or if they enable more debtors to pay attorneys by increasing their effective 
wealth.39  
Tort Defendants. The insurance theory assumes that creditors can respond to 
exemptions by raising interest rates or refusing to extend credit; this is clearly not true of 
tort victims. People who are repeatedly subject to tort suits may form an interest group 
that would lobby for larger exemptions, which would amount to a wealth transfer from 
potential tort victims to potential tort defendants. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
doctors, who face expensive malpractice claims, form one such interest group.40 
Secured creditors. The choice of exemptions might also reflect a conflict among 
creditors. Banks and other institutions that specialize in secured debt might want more 
generous exemptions because exemptions do not interfere with secured debt—they only 
interfere with unsecured debt—and thus raise the demand for secured debt relative to 
unsecured debt. If it is costly for unsecured creditors to enter the secured credit market 
(this is by no means clear), lobbying for high exemptions is a form of raising rivals’ costs. 
Evidence shows that while exemptions seem to raise interest rates and reduce access to 
credit generally,41 the same is not true of home mortgage credit where larger homestead 
exemptions may actually lead to a slight decline in interest rates and a slight increase in 
access to credit.42 We therefore predict that exemptions increase as the power of secured 
creditors increases relative to the power of unsecured creditors.43 
                                                 
39 The evidence on whether exemption laws increase bankruptcy filings is inconclusive, and on whether they increase 
debt litigation is nonexistent. Lawyers did support more generous exemptions in the legislative history of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978. See Posner, supra note __. 
40 In Florida, where the homestead exemption has no monetary limit, “Almost annually, members of the Florida 
Legislature try, without much success so far, to eliminate or curtail bankruptcy benefits to prevent abuses. Earlier this 
year, for example, a bill to limit the homestead exemption to $250,000 was defeated. Aides to lawmakers said the defeat 
was largely because of objections from Florida doctors’ groups, which feared what might happen to doctors who lose 
malpractice suits.” Larry Rohter, Rich Debtors Finding Shelter Under a Populist Florida Law, New York Times, July 25, 
1993, at p. 1. 
41 See Gropp, et al, supra note ___. 
42 See Jeremy Berkowitz and Richard Hynes, Bankruptcy Exemptions and the Market for Home Mortgage Loans, 42 J. 
Law & Econ. 809 (1999). 
43 See Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 Emory L.J. 587 (1995); Daniel J. Villegas, 
Regulation of Creditor Practices: An Evaluation of the FTC’s Credit Practice Rule, 42 J. Econ. & Bus. 51 (1990). Villegas 
shows that laws that restrict wage assignments (for example) are correlated with a reduction in the amount of household 
credit supplied by finance companies and an increase in the amount of household credit supplied by credit unions. Id., p. 
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D. History and prices 
We mentioned earlier that several commentators justify uniform federal exemptions 
on the ground that the state exemptions are “archaic,” the implication being that state 
legislators do not care enough about exemptions to bother changing them. To expand on 
this theory, one might conjecture that exemptions served particular purposes in the 
nineteenth century when they were introduced—purposes that have been lost to time—
but since then they have been ignored, or alternatively, legislatures have intervened only 
to keep them current with prices, perhaps because they feel that old laws need to be kept 
up to date though not necessarily questioned and revised.  
1. History 
Although, as we will discuss, historical exemptions partially predict current 
exemptions, there are two reasons not to place much weight on the historical artifact 
theory of exemptions. The first is the continued tension between state and federal 
control over the exemptions and the number of changes in the state exemptions. From 
1976 to 1996 there were almost 3.5 statutory increases per year to the state homestead 
exemptions alone and at least one state changed its homestead exemption in every year 
of our study except 1994; the federal exemptions were changed in 1984 and 1994. While 
some of these changes can be attributed to legislative response to judicial decisions,44 this 
is unlikely to be a complete explanation. 
Second, the historical artifact theory begs the question, Why did state exemptions 
vary historically? We do not have the data to provide a complete answer. We do, 
however, explore a few theories—competition for migrants and the size of a state’s farm 
economy—in Part III.C. For the most part, however, we take historical variation in 
exemptions as given in this paper. 
2. Prices 
One justification commonly offered for continued state, rather than federal, control 
of exemptions is that there are significant cost of living differences across regions that 
states are in the better position to determine. We doubt that this explanation can explain 
much of the variance across states because the differences in the exemptions are simply 
too great and a casual glance at Figure 1 reveals no obvious relationship between 
                                                                                                                                                 
65. Villegas reasons that because finance companies specialize in issuing unsecured credit to relatively risky people, 
restrictions on wage assignments hurt them but not credit unions which rely on payroll deductions to enforce their 
claims, so that people at the margin switch from finance companies to credit unions as the former raise their prices or 
restrict credit. It therefore follows, as Letsou suggests, that credit unions might lobby for restrictions in order to raise the 
costs of their rivals. Similar logic applies to banks, which also specialize in relatively low-risk credit. Although in Villegas’ 
study banks are not benefited or hurt by restrictions, the study is by no means conclusive, and it is plausible that banks 
would adopt a legislative strategy of raising the costs of their competitors. (For evidence that banks and finance 
companies compete for household borrowers, see Gregory E. Elliehausen and John D. Wolken, Market Definition and 
Product Segmentation for Household Credit, 4 J. Fin. Services Res. 21 (1990).) Unfortunately, in recent years banks have 
been obtaining an increasingly large fraction of their revenues from credit card loans, so it is no longer so clear that they 
benefit from exemptions. It is worth noting that during legislative hearings on bankruptcy reform in 1992, banks sought 
amendments that would protect mortgages in Chapter 13, but expressed no opinion on exemption levels. See Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 
102d Cong., 2d Sess., July 8, 1992, at p. 58. 
44 For example, in 1983 Maryland repealed its homestead exemption and enacted a wildcard exemption in its place in 
response to a court ruling that the homestead exemption was invalid. In re Locarno, 23 B.R. 622 (Bkrtcy. MD. 1982). 
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exemptions and those states typically thought of as having a high cost of living. 
However, it is possible that differences in the inflation rate across regions explain 
different rates of increase in the exemptions and we cannot dismiss it out of hand. 
Therefore, we test this theory using various kinds of price data. 
III. EMPIRICAL TESTS 
We test the hypotheses with data from each of the 50 states (but not the District of 
Columbia45) for the years, 1975-1996. 
A. Dependent variables 
Exemption laws are complicated, and converting them into variables requires 
numerous difficult compromises. We give a flavor of the difficulties here; a complete 
description would be tedious. 
The typical state provides for homestead, personal property, and various 
miscellaneous exemptions that are hard to categorize and quantify. These latter 
exemptions might include burial funds, legal claims, fraternal benefit society annuities, 
insurance benefits, pensions, unemployment, veteran’s benefits, and public assistance. 
We exclude these exemptions from our analysis because of the difficulty of 
quantification, the illiquidity of many of them, the existence in many states of low dollar 
ceilings over them, and in general their usual small value compared to homestead and 
personal property exemptions. One must keep them in mind, however, when 
interpreting the regressions. 
Homestead exemptions usually specify a dollar amount of home equity that the 
debtor is entitled to protect, but some states instead specify an acreage limit so that in 
principle a house of unlimited value may be exempted. Personal property exemptions 
also usually specify a dollar amount, but often they are divided into categories (e.g., 
home furnishings or tools of the trade) with or without individual or aggregate limits.  
The “unlimited” exemptions pose significant problems in our study for both 
homestead and personal property exemptions. Clearly the home can be quite valuable, 
but many items of relatively low value, such as wedding rings and furniture, often have 
no dollar limit either. One cannot simply ignore personal property exemptions without 
dollar limitations as this erroneously treats them as less valuable than similar 
exemptions that do have a specific limit, however large. On the other hand, one cannot 
treat the “unlimited” wedding ring as if it were potentially as valuable as a mansion, 
both as a matter of common sense, and as a result of judicial hostility toward aggressive 
exemption planning.46 
Our approach to this problem is to use observed limits to determine caps for several 
categories of property, including the home. Choosing the appropriate cap was difficult 
as often one state exemption was significantly greater than the others. For example, 
Louisiana allows the exemption of wedding and engagement rings up to $5,000 (a 
                                                 
45 The District of Columbia is excluded because its exemptions are set by Congress; it does not have an independent 
legislature, unlike the states. 
46 See, e.g., Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 878 (8th Cir. 1988); In re Krantz, 97 B.R. 514 (Bankr. N.D. 
Iowa 1989). 
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significant sum in 1975) while the next highest observed limit was $1,000. We converted 
all exemptions into real values and then capped all real values (including the unlimited 
exemptions) at the average of the two highest observed exemptions from different 
states.47 We then converted the values back into nominal terms. 
This method is suspect, and thus we consider alternative specifications. We try 
dropping all states that have an “unlimited” exemption, but this results in the loss of too 
many observations if we consider all types of personal property. Therefore, we also try 
restricting our attention to only a few types of personal property exemptions (motor 
vehicle exemptions and wildcard exemptions) as this dramatically reduces the number 
of “unlimited” exemptions. 
Some empirical work on exemptions focuses on homestead exemptions alone. There 
are two problems with this approach. First, it leaves unclear how to treat states, such as 
Maryland and Virginia, with large “wildcard” exemptions that can be applied toward 
real or personal property.48 More seriously, this approach can give a misleading 
impression as to which states are more generous. To see this, imagine that an individual 
has $50,000 of home equity and $50,000 in personal property; and imagine that state X 
has a homestead exemption of $30,000 and a personal property exemption of $20,000, 
and that state Y has a homestead exemption of $20,000 and a personal property 
exemption of $30,000. If one counted only homestead exemptions, state X would appear 
more generous than state Y, but it is not clear which state our individual would prefer. 
One of the major differences between the federal exemptions created by the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and most of the then existing state exemption systems 
was that the entire value of the federal homestead exemption could be used toward 
personal property of the debtor’s choosing. The generosity of homeowner exemptions 
relative to nonhomeowner exemptions continues to be an important issue, with the 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission calling for much greater use of “spillover” 
provisions than are typically found in state exemptions today.49 Therefore, we consider 
separately the aggregate exemptions that could be claimed by a homeowner and the 
aggregate exemptions that could be claimed by a nonhomeowner.50 
A further complication arises from the existence in some states of the doctrine of 
tenancy by the entirety, which prevents creditors of one spouse from seizing certain 
jointly held real property.51 Because this can serve as a substitute for the homestead 
exemption, we tried treating those states that allow the use of this doctrine as if they had 
unlimited homestead exemptions, but, except where noted, this did not qualitatively 
affect our results. 
                                                 
47 In the case of the homestead exemption, this was an average of North Dakota’s 1979 homestead exemption ($345,833 in 
1996 dollars) and Minnesota’s 1993 homestead exemption ($217,194 in 1996 dollars). 
48 Compare Md. Cs & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 11-504 and VA. Code Ann. §§ 34-4. 
49 Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years (1997). 
50 A further problem – the fact that many changes in the exemption laws will not affect people with few assets and so 
might not properly be considered real changes – we deal with directly in the regressions. Compare White’s effort to 
calculate effective exemptions. See Michelle J. White, Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. Econ. & 
Org. 205 (1998). 
51 The application of this doctrine is not uniform across states where it remains in use. We restricted our attention to those 
states that retain a fairly strong version of this doctrine. A good description of the various incarnations of this doctrine can 
be found in Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294-95 (HI 1977). 
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Exemptions in some states also can vary with the debtor’s age, disability, marital 
status, and status as a veteran. So that we may compare exemptions across states, we 
assume that all debtors are married, have two children and do not qualify for increased 
exemptions as a result of age, disability or veteran’s status. We further assume that all 
exemptions may be doubled (because the Bankruptcy Code and most states permit each 
spouse separately to claim an exemption) unless a statute or a specific case explicitly 
provides otherwise. 
Because debtors in states that have not opted out may choose the federal exemptions 
in bankruptcy, we must make an assumption about whether those states have “chosen” 
the federal exemptions and whether they “chose” the changes in the federal exemptions 
in 1984 and 1994. That is, the choice not to opt out might be attributed in part to simple 
passivity. Moreover, the federal exemptions are an imperfect substitute for most state 
property exemptions because the federal exemptions are not available outside 
bankruptcy. Therefore, we test our hypotheses about the level of exemptions 
alternatively using just the state exemptions and the greater of the state and federal 
exemptions for those states that have not opted out. 
Because we are testing our hypotheses over twenty-two years, we must account for 
inflation. We create real values for the exemptions by dividing by the consumer price 
index. 
The following table lists the various ways that we specify the dependent variable. 
[Table 2: Main Dependent Variables] 
Summary statistics are in the appendix. More useful for present purposes is a list of 
the correlations among our main dependent variables in Table 3. The homeowner 
exemptions are fairly well correlated, as are the nonhomeowners exemptions; there is 
less correlation between the two main groups. 
[Table 3: Dependant Variable Correlations] 
In all of our regressions we use the alternative specifications described in Table 2. 
We report below only a few of them, and we note when the alternative regressions are 
consistent with our illustrative regressions and when they are not. 
B. Federalism and opting out 
We separately considered why a state might choose to opt out, and how a state that 
opts out might change its exemption levels in the processing of opting out. 
1. The choice to opt out 
Thirty-seven states have exercised the right to opt out.52 All but two of the states 
(California and Mississippi) exercised the right by 1982, four years after enactment of the 
Code. We want to understand why these states opted out of the federal system.53 
                                                 
52 One state, Arkansas, opted back in, in order to evade a state constitutional limit on its personal property exemption. See 
In re Holt, 894 F.2d 1005 (1990). We treat Arkansas as an opt-out state. Another state, New Hampshire, opted back in after 
our period in 1997. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. s. 511:2 (1996). 
53 Using a hazard model we tested whether the timing of opt out was correlated with the independent variables, but 
found weak and nonrobust results. This probably reflects the clustering of opt outs within four years of enactment of the 
 17
Figure 3 shows the opt-out states (shaded); the states whose homeowner 
exemptions, broadly defined, exceeded the federal homeowner exemption at the time of 
the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (identified by large dots); the states 
whose nonhomeowners exemptions, broadly defined, exceed the federal 
nonhomeowner exemption at the time of the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978 (small dots). Correlations (not reported) confirm the visual impression that there is 
at best a small relationship between states that opt out and states that have exemptions 
less than federal exemptions; this remains true when states with TBE are treated as 
though they had unlimited homestead exemptions.54 
[Figure 3: 1978 Exemptions and Decision to Opt Out] 
To investigate our “choice” hypotheses more formally, we ran probit regressions 
with the dependant variable a dummy equal to one if the state has ever opted out, and 
zero if not. The first type of independent variable is a measure of the generosity of the 
federal exemption level compared to the state’s. The idea is that a state is more likely to 
opt out if the federal exemption is significantly more generous than the state’s 
exemption. This theory is complicated by the fact that some state exemptions are more 
generous than the federal exemptions. Because our story is based on the “pressure” 
provided by more generous federal exemptions, once state exemptions exceed the 
federal exemptions, it should not matter by how much. However, this assumes that our 
coding of the exemptions captures all of the relevant differences, which it clearly does 
not. Therefore, we generally followed the simplest approach and subtracted the state 
level from the federal level,55 though we also tried setting a floor on this difference at 
zero. 
The other main independent variables are the state’s ideology (a scale from 1 to 5, 
with 5 being more liberal); and the bankruptcy filing rate (per 10,000 people). The first 
requires some explanation. We relied on a study of political attitudes across states 
during our period (through 1988).56 The ideology measure was derived from polls that 
asked people whether they consider themselves liberal or conservative. The variation is 
cross-sectional only; the authors of the study did not find much change over time. The 
variation is also correlated with measures of party identification in a state (Democratic 
versus Republican) controlling for Democratic dominance in the conservative South 
until recently. 
The results are in Table 4. 
[Table 4: Determinants of the Choice to Opt out] 
The effects of the bankruptcy filing rate and ideology are as predicted. If a state has 
a million people, and the number of filings increases by 100, the probability of opting 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bankruptcy Code; further, as a theoretical matter, we have no reason to believe that states would wait before opting out. 
Bargaining models with asymmetric information would be too hard to test. 
54 The correlation for opt-out and real federal minus state homeowner is 0.007; for opt-out and real federal minus state 
nonhomeowner is 0.218, and lots of variation in between. No correlation is significant at the 10% level. 
55 This is essentially equivalent to looking at the negative of the exemption level. 
56 Robert S. Erickson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy (1993). 
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out increases by about 0.05.57 If a state moves from the average level of liberalness, to the 
next quintile, its probability of opting out decreases by about 0.10. More conservative 
states thus tend to opt out. The results are robust: they persist not only across different 
specifications of the exemption, but also in regressions that include other independent 
variables that might be thought to explain states’ opt-out choices.58 
The story about exemption differences is more complex. The results in these 
regressions, and others that are unreported, are almost always in the right direction and 
occasionally significant.59 In particular, federal-state nonhomeowner differences are more 
likely to predict opt-out than are federal-state homeowner differences. This is not 
surprising. The federal exemptions available to homeowners were less generous than 
many of the state exemptions then in existence and therefore probably did not serve as a 
strong motive to opt out for many states. By contrast, because the entire federal 
homestead exemption could be used toward personal property, the federal exemptions 
available to nonhomeowners were significantly greater than the exemptions of almost all 
of the states. Contemporary complaints about the generosity of the federal exemptions 
usually centered on the wildcard exemptions, including the mislabeled federal 
homestead exemption. Our results are consistent with this and suggest that states opted 
out to avoid the high personal federal exemption levels, not the relatively low federal 
homestead. However, we stress that even our strongest results are quite weak: a $10,000 
increase in the fed-state difference for the narrowly defined nonhomeowners exemption 
(real) increases the probability of opting out by only 0.13. 
In sum, we find weak but suggestive evidence that states opted out in order to 
prevent resident debtors from taking advantage of the generous federal personal 
property exemptions, and that they did so because they feared that these exemptions 
would increase their already high bankruptcy filing rate. Further, we find that more 
conservative states were more likely to opt out, reflecting perhaps an ideological 
aversion to federal interference even when it is purely symbolic. 
2. Exemption changes when states opt out 
We argued that the Bankruptcy Code served in 1978 as a shock to each within-state 
political equilibrium. It gave bargaining power to groups that prefer more generous 
exemptions, and yet obviously groups that prefer the status quo would not be helpless. 
One predicts that the two groups would strike a new bargain: opting out but with an 
increase of the exemption to a level between the status quo and the federal system. One 
also predicts that the exemption level would not change significantly in states which are 
already more generous than the federal system, even if they do opt out (for ideological 
or other undiscovered reasons). 
                                                 
57 This is consistent with the previous literature which found states with higher bankruptcy filing rates in 1978 were more 
likely to have opted out of the federal exemptions and chosen a homestead exemption less than the federal homestead 
exemption. See Alden F. Shiers and Daniel P. Williamson, “Nonbusiness Bankruptcies and the Law: Some Empirical 
Results,” 21 J. Consumer Affairs 277, 290 (1987). 
58 These are the independent variables that we use in the exemption level regressions in Part III.C; they are insignificant 
when included in the regressions. 
59 This remains true when we try some other independent variables, including income per capita, population density, and 
divorce rate, which were insignificant. 
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Initially, we checked our assumption that states increase their exemptions at the 
same time that they opt out, rather than in separate statutes over time, which might 
indicate the lack of deal making. We found that this is true at a 1% significance level for 
all kinds of exemptions. (It is true for all years and each individual year except 1979 
when there were only four states that opted out.) 
One way to test our hypothesis is to look at the relationship between opting out and 
the extent to which states increase their exemptions. There is a baseline problem, 
however. Although we could look at the amount that a state increases its exemption in 
the year that it opts out, it is not clear whether this should be compared to exemption 
increases in all states (including the non-opt-out years of the states that opt out); in only 
states that do opt out; or in only states whose exemptions are greater than the federal 
exemptions. We prefer the most general comparison, but tested alternative 
specifications. 
A very rough test looks at correlations between the decision to opt out (yes=1) and 
the increase in the real exemption level during the period when most states opted out, 
1978 to 1982. Panel A of Table 5 reports the correlation with the dollar increase in the 
exemptions and Panel B reports the correlation with the percentage increase. Finally, 
Panel C reports the difference between the mean dollar and percentage increase of those 
states that opted out and those states that did not.  
[Table 5: Correlation Between Opting Out and Real Exemption Increase from 1978 
to 1982] 
The correlations are consistent with our bargain hypothesis though they are not 
terribly robust (nor are they robust against alternative specifications not reported). As 
was true when we tested opt-out levels, nonhomeowner exemptions seem to matter 
more for opting out, consistent with the observation that states already had high 
homestead exemptions (or TBE) and were mainly concerned with the generosity of the 
federal personal property exemptions.60 
The results summarized in Panel C imply that this effect was both statistically and 
economically significant; the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 apparently caused some 
states to increase their exemptions by several thousand dollars. In fact, absent this 
change, the real value of the exemptions may well have decreased during this period of 
high inflation as is indicated by the experience of the states that did not opt out.  
In order to test the robustness of these simple statistics, we also ran regressions. We 
estimated the following equation: 
Log(Exemption) = State Dummy + State Dummy * (Year—1975) + State Dummy*(Opt Out Year—1978)^2 + 
[(Opt Out Year—3 Dummy) + (Opt Out Year—2 Dummy) + (Opt Out Year—1 Dummy) + (Opt Out Year 
Dummy) + (Opt Out Year + 1 Dummy) + (Opt Out Year + 2 Dummy) + (Opt Out Year + 3 Dummy)], 
with the second and third terms (on the right hand side) designed to control for the 
state-specific exemption trends, and the opt out dummies (for the year of opt out, and 
                                                 
60 Some alternative specifications limited to states with homeowners’ exemptions less than federal finds the “wrong” sign 
when comparing the growth in some measures of the homeowners’ exemptions in opt-out states to the growth in states 
that did not opt-out. However, these results are far from statistically significant, and are likely due to a very low number 
of observations. 
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for the three years before and after opt out) designed to reveal when the exemption 
changes took place. We ran two separate regressions limited to opt-out states, one for 
states whose exemptions are less generous than the federal; the other for states whose 
exemptions are more generous than federal. 61 We predicted that only states with less 
generous exemptions would increase them when they opted out, for only in those states 
did the Bankruptcy Code act as a shock to the equilibrium exemption level. The results 
are in Table 6, and illustrated in Figure 4. 
[Table 6: Effect of Opting Out on Level of Exemptions] 
The F statistic in Table 6 tests whether, on average and controlling for the other 
factors listed above, states increased their exemptions in the year that they opted-out 
from the previous year. If one focuses on those states that had exemptions less generous 
than the federal exemptions, the answer is clearly yes. If one focuses on those states with 
exemptions more generous than the federal exemptions, the test is not statistically 
significant.62 
[Figure 4: Effect of Opting Out on Level of Exemptions] 
Figure 4 presents these results graphically. Specifically, Figure 4 presents the 
exemption growth rate relative to the state trend.63 If there is nothing unusual about that 
year, we expect the value to be one. This is roughly the case for all years except the year 
in which a state opts out. Those states that had exemptions less than the federal 
exemptions show a significant deviation in the year that they opt out, those that had 
exemptions greater than the federal exemptions do not. 
In sum, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Bankruptcy Code led 
to an increase in exemptions in states with relatively strict exemptions (especially, 
personal property) by giving bargaining power to groups that preferred more generous 
local exemptions. 
C. Exemption levels: Public interest and public choice theories; history; prices 
We hypothesized that a state chooses its exemption level on the basis of public 
interest factors—credit insurance and altruism—and interest group influence. Among 
possible interest groups, we identified farmers (or debtors generally), lawyers, tort 
defendants, and secured creditors. There are many possible proxies for these variables; 
we settled on the following:64 
                                                 
61 We also ran regressions focusing on all states with exemptions greater and less than the federal exemptions and the 
results were virtually identical to those presented. 
62 These results held up well for alternative specifications, except in some regressions n was too low for significant results 
(for example, nonhomeowner exemptions when the state exceeds the federal, which we do not report). We also find, as 
predicted, that most states do not raise their exemptions above the federal level. 
63 Mathematically, Figure 4 graphs the exponent of the coefficient in year t divided by the exponent of the coefficient in 
year t-1. 
64 Formal definitions and sources are in Table 7, Panel C. 
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Divorce rate might be a proxy for risk, as divorce appears to lead to bankruptcy.65 
Under the credit insurance and altruism theories, states might increase exemptions in 
order to protect divorced people from debts they accumulated during marriage; in 
effect, insurance against the credit consequences of divorce. As the divorce rate 
increases, so should exemptions. 
Income per capita (real) is a proxy for the extent of poverty. Under the credit 
insurance and altruism theories, states might increase exemptions to help prevent 
people from falling into poverty. As income per capita increases, exemptions should 
decline. 
Total transfers per capita is another proxy for risk or altruism. However, the transfer 
level could be a substitute for exemptions. If not, we predict that exemptions increase 
with transfers. 
Charitable giving is a more direct proxy for altruism. However, it might be a 
substitute for generous exemption laws. If not, we predict that exemptions increase with 
giving. 
Population density is a proxy for migration demand: states with a less dense 
population increase their exemptions to attract migrants who do not want to pay their 
debts. We predict that exemptions decline with population density. 
Farm proprietors per capita is a proxy for the power of farming interest groups. We 
predict that exemptions (especially homestead exemptions) increase with farm 
proprietors per capita. 
Banking could be a measure of secured creditor influence. Secured creditors ought to 
support exemption increases if the higher price of unsecured creditor drives debtors into 
the arms of secured creditors, and there are barriers between the markets. Exemptions 
should increase as banking increases. 
Finally, we use history (homestead exemptions as of 1920), prices (geographic cost of 
living and differences in regional inflation rates]), and ideology (on a 1-5 scale, with 5 
most liberal). We also tested to see whether increases in the exemptions were correlated 
with regional cost of living changes obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
However, we could not find any statistically significant correlation. 
We acknowledge the ambiguity of direction of causation for many of these 
variables. For example, in theory increasing exemptions might make divorce more 
attractive for debt-burdened spouses, and thus result in an increase in the divorce rate. 
We also acknowledge the problem of omitted variable bias; for example, divorce rate 
and exemption level might both be the effect of changes in the labor market. However, 
our results turn out to be weak, and these problems can thus be ignored. 
We performed a variety of regressions, using different techniques and specifications 
of the variables. The only result in which we have confidence is the influence of the 
history variable in cross section regressions for each of the years in the period. The 
                                                 
65 There is some doubt about whether this correlation is real; compare Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 Ind. L.J. 1 (1987), and Jagdeep S. Bhandar and Lawrence A. Weiss, The 
Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1 (1993).  
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variable is highly significant and robust against the inclusion of various combinations of 
other variables. 
No other variable performs well. We report some of our cross-sectional and pooled 
regressions with state and year fixed effects (Table 7). 
[Table 7: Exemption Levels] 
The results are disappointing, but not too surprising. We hazard that exemption 
laws mattered less during our period than in the nineteenth century, when debt relief 
was a more salient political issue and migration was a more pressing need for low 
density states. Although data from that period are not good, we did run regressions of 
the 1920 exemption level on population density and farmers per capita and found these 
variables to be significant at the ten percent level in the predicted direction.66 
During the twenty-two year period under study, exemptions continued to matter—
there is no doubt of that, from the frequent changes, and the many special interest 
exemptions that we do not code for—but they are not as politically salient as they used 
to be, and they probably track public interest and public choice variables crudely at best. 
There is not enough cross-sectional data to test these theories if the effects are subtle. 
Adding time-series data increases the number of observations, but creates econometric 
problems, for exemption changes within a state are not likely to be independent of each 
other. So although pooled regressions (not reported) generate significant effects, they 
disappear when state and year fixed effects are added (Table 7, Panel B). 
CONCLUSION 
We have not fully explained bankruptcy exemption law, but we have fitted together 
a few pieces of the puzzle. Historical evidence suggests that exemptions were initially 
popular as a way to protect existing debtors against creditors, and of attracting migrants 
to sparsely populated states. Inertia appears to explain some of the cross-sectional 
variation that we observe starting in 1975, and continuing through 1996. Existing law 
always supplies the starting point from which legislators bargain over reform, and so 
very old laws can exert influence over the present and recent past. 
Our evidence does not support any of the many theories for variation in exemption 
law. If exemption laws were once designed to protect debtor interests, there is no 
evidence that they still do so, or that they play an important role in the welfare system 
by protecting people from the consequences of default. The evidence does not support 
the theory that exemptions reflect altruism on the part of wealthier citizens. And the 
evidence does not support interest group theories that emphasize the role of creditors 
such as banks, debtors such as farmers, lawyers, or doctors. Without more data, most of 
the post-1975 variation in exemption laws will remain a mystery. 
Our strongest results concern opt-out. After 1978, most state legislatures were 
confronted with federal exemptions that were more generous than the state 
nonhomeowner exemptions. Most states responded by opting out. We found that 
conservative states were more likely to opt out than liberal states, and that states with 
                                                 
66 Because population density and farmers per capita were highly correlated (negatively), the significant results for both 
occurred only in separate regressions. 
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higher bankruptcy rates were more likely to opt out than states with lower bankruptcy 
rates. Legislators who wanted to opt out because of ideology, concern about bankruptcy 
filings, or other reasons, had to strike a deal with legislators who preferred the more 
generous federal exemptions; as a consequence we observed that states raised their 
exemption levels as they opted out. 
These results give us some clues about the political history of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act. The battle between the House and the Senate over exemptions was, it turns 
out, really a battle over whether nonhomeowners ought to enjoy more generous 
exemptions (the original House bill) or be stuck with the original stingy state 
exemptions (the original Senate bill).67 The compromise was the opt-out system, and it 
really was a compromise in the sense that the effective exemptions for nonhomeowners 
in nearly all stingy states went up—either because federal exemptions became available 
to debtors or states raise their exemptions as they opted out. At the same time, the law 
permitted the states more local control and resulted in more variation than would have 
been the case if the Senate and House had merely agreed on uniform federal exemptions 
that were somewhat lower than those in the House bill. 
 
 
                                                 
67 What did the Senate get in return for giving up incorporation of state exemptions, the status quo? The most likely 
answer is new patronage opportunities resulting from the elevation of bankruptcy judges. See Posner, supra note __. 
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Table 1: Nominal Homestead and Personal Property Exemptions for a Household 
 
State Homestead Personal Property TBE Opt Out 
 1975 1996 Ave. Annual Growth 1975 1996   
AK 19,000 62,100 11% 5,000 6,900  1982 
AL 4,000 10,000 7% 2,000 6,000  1980 
AR U U  500 500  1981 
AZ 15,000 100,000 27% 0 3,000  1980 
CA 20,000 75,000 13% 1,000 3,800  1984 
CO 15,000 60,000 14% 1,000 2,000  1981 
CT 0 150,000  0 5,000   
DE 0 0 0% 500 10,500 yes 1981 
FL U U  2,000 4,000 yes 1979 
GA 1,000 10,000 43% 0 2,800  1980 
HI 50,000 50,000 0% 2,000 2,000 yes  
IA U U  0 2,400  1981 
ID 14,000 100,000 29% 1,000 3,000  1981 
IL 10,000 15,000 2% 1,300 6,400  1981 
IN 1,400 15,000 46% 1,200 8,000 yes 1980 
KS U U  U 40,000  1980 
KY 2,000 10,000 19% 4,000 7,000  1980 
LA 15,000 15,000 0% U U  1979 
MA 24,000 100,000 15% 1,400 1,400 yes  
MD 0 0 0% 1,000 11,000 yes 1981 
ME 6,000 25,000 15% 2,000 5,800  1981 
MI 7,000 7,000 0% 0 0 yes  
MN U 200,000  4,000 6,800   
MO 2,000 8,000 14% 1,300 4,150 yes 1982 
MS 30,000 150,000 19% 0 20,000  1987 
MT 40,000 80,000 5% 0 2,400  1981 
NC 2,000 20,000 43% 1,000 3,000 yes 1981 
ND 80,000 160,000 5% 5,000 7,400  1981 
NE 8,000 20,000 7% 0 0  1980 
NH 5,000 60,000 52% 0 10,000  1981 
NJ 0 0 0% 2,000 2,000   
NM 20,000 60,000 10% U 9,000   
NV 25,000 125,000 19% 2,000 2,000  1981 
NY 4,000 20,000 19% 0 4,800  1982 
OH 0 10,000  0 2,800 yes 1979 
OK U U  3,000 6,000  1980 
OR 12,000 33,000 8% 1,600 4,200  1981 
PA 0 0 0% 0 300 yes  
RI 0 0 0% 0 0 yes  
SC 2,000 10,000 19% 1,000 2,400  1981 
SD U U  2,000 4,000  1980 
TN 7,500 7,500 0% 0 8,000  1980 
TX U U  20,000 30,000   
UT 11,000 11,000 0% 0 3,000  1981 
VA 10,000 11,000 <1% 0 4,000 yes 1979 
VT 10,000 150,000 67% 0 14,800 yes  
WA 20,000 60,000 10% 0 5,000   
WI 25,000 40,000 3% 4,000 4,400   
WV 0 30,000  0 6,400  1981 
WY 20,000 20,000 0% 0 4,800 yes 1980 
Mean 12,788 48,595 13% 1,549 6,187   
Federal* 15,000 30,000 5% 3,200 6,400   
Note: amounts are nominal; U means no dollar limit; pp considers only wildcard and automobile exemptions; for 
household of four.  *Because Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 not yet enacted in 1975, values presented as of 
1979. 
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Table 2: Main Dependent Variables 
 
Basic Variable Abbreviation Description 
Homestead Hstead Homestead exemption 
Homeowners Hown Aggregate of homestead and personal property 
exemption 
Nonhome Owners NHown Personal property exemption plus any spillover for those 
who do not claim the homestead exemption 
Variants 
Nominal Nom The dollar value of exemptions 
Real R The dollar value divided by regional CPI 
Logged L The dollar value logged 
Exclude Excl Excluding states with unlimited homestead from the 
sample 
Cap Cap Including unlimited homestead exemptions, calculated 
by taking the mean of the two highest real values and 
converting to nominal value 
Narrow Nar Excluding unlimited personal property exemptions of 
high value 
Broad Brd Including unlimited personal property exemptions of 
high value, calculated by taking the mean of the two 
highest real values in the category and converting to 
nominal value 
Tenancy by Entirety TBE Treating states with dollar homestead exemptions and 
TBE as though they had unlimited homestead 
exemptions 
Federal Fed The maximum of the state and federal exemptions in 
states that have not opted out 
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Figure 1: Homestead exemptions for married couple in 1996 
 
 
Note: States with unlimited exemptions marked with “pins.”
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Figure 2: Nominal Exemptions Over Time 
Year 
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Table 3: Dependant Variable Correlations 
 
Homestead exemptions excluding states with unlimited exemptions (excl) compared with 
homestead exemptions including those states but capping their exemptions (cap) 
(obs=928) 
 
| excl cap
---------+------------------
excl | 1.0000
cap | 0.9995 1.0000
Pairwise correlation of different types of homeowner exemptions 
Excl Cap Cap
Brd Nar Brd Nar TBE
----------+---------------------------------------------
Excl Brd| 1.0000
| 709
|
Nar| 0.9877 1.0000
| 709 898
|
Cap Brd| 0.9995 0.9574 1.0000
| 709 898 1100
|
Nar| 0.9877 0.9996 0.9844 1.0000
| 709 898 1100 1100
|
Cap TBE| 0.1681 0.1945 0.5613 0.5489 1.0000
| 709 898 1100 1100 1100
|
Correlation of capped exemptions 
(obs=1100) 
NHown NHown Pers Hown Hstead
Brd Nar Brd Brd
---------+---------------------------------------------
NHown Brd| 1.0000
NHown Nar| 0.7002 1.0000
Pers Brd| 0.9817 0.6236 1.0000
Hown Brd| 0.4841 0.3407 0.5068 1.0000
Hstead | 0.2873 0.2197 0.3078 0.9762 1.0000
 
Note: see Table 2 for variable descriptions and abbreviations     
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Figure 3: 1978 Exemptions and Decision to Opt Out 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 
Shaded states: states that have opted out 
Large dots: states with homeowner exemptions greater than federal in 1978 
Small dots: states with nonhomeowner exemptions greater than federal in 1978 
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Table 4: Determinants of the Choice to Opt Out 
 
 
Homeowner Difference (Federal Minus State) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bk filing /10,000 0.04572 
[0.001]*** 
0.04144 
[0.001]*** 
0.04240 
[0.001]*** 
0.04357 
[0.001]*** 
0.04557 
[0.001]*** 
0.04359 
[0.001]*** 
 
Ideo (lib. +) -0.11298 
[0.007]*** 
-0.10737 
[0.008]*** 
-0.11221 
[0.005]*** 
-0.11371 
[0.005]*** 
-0.10894 
[0.015]** 
-0.11377 
[0.005]*** 
Nar 0.00057 
[0.189] 
     
Excl. unlimited  0.00077 
[0.173] 
    
Brd, cap   0.00066 
[0.050]** 
   
Nar, cap    0.00064 
[0.094]* 
  
Brd, cap, TBE     0.00041 
[0.324] 
 
H
om
eo
w
ne
r E
xe
m
pt
io
ns
 
Nar, cap, TBE      0.00064 
[0.094]* 
 Obs. 48 40 48 48 48 48 
 
Nonhomeowner Difference (Federal Minus State) 
 (7) (8) 
Bk filing /10,000 0.04606 
[0.001]*** 
0.04264 
[0.000]*** 
 
Ideo (liberal +) -0.10524 
[0.014]** 
-0.11374 
[0.002]*** 
Brd, cap 0.00324 
[0.041]** 
 
H
om
eo
w
ne
r 
Ex
em
pt
io
ns
 
Nar, cap  0.01201 
[0.000]*** 
 Obs. 48 48 
 
Note: dependent variables is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the state has opted out.  
Coefficients refer to the marginal increase in the probability of opting out as a result of a one unit 
increase in the independent variable (probit). All exemption values are federal minus state, in real 
$1000s. See Table 2 for abbreviations. 
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Table 5: Correlation Between Opting Out and Real Exemption Increase from 1978 to 1982 
 
 Homeowner Nonhomeowner Homestead Pers. Prop. 
PANEL A brd/cap nar/cap brd/cap nar/cap cap excl brd/cap nar/cap 
Difference 0.242 0.152 0.322 0.219 0.131 0.138 0.297 0.119
P value (0.09)* (0.29) (0.02)** (0.13) (0.36) (0.38) (0.04)** (0.41)
Obs. 50 50 50 50 50 42 50 50
PANEL B 
% Growth 0.244 0.177 0.311 0.266 0.110 0.110 0.311 0.208
P value (0.09)* (0.23) (0.03)** (0.12) (0.48) (0.48) (0.03)** (0.25)
Obs. 50 47 49 36 43 43 49 33
PANEL C 
Opt out states 
minus others 
$12,228 $6,785 $9,054 $3,611 $6,475 $5,617 $6,612 $1,169
P value (0.13) (0.40) (0.01)*** (0.08)* (0.47) (0.46) (0.02)** (0.48)
1978 mean 
exemption 
$43,248 $34,624 $11,366 $2,743 $32,261 $21,056 $11,026 $3,848
 
Note: all real values, 1996 dollars.  See Table 2 for abbreviations.  Panel A shows the correlation between 
opting out and the real exemption increase in dollars from 1978 to 1982 (using different specifications of 
the exemption variable).  Panel B shows the correlation between opting and the real exemption in 
percentage.  Panel C shows the dollar difference between states that opt out and states that do not.  The 
bottom row, which shows the 1978 mean exemption, gives a sense of the magnitudes involved. 
 
 
PANEL D Homeowner Nonhomeowner Homestead Pers. Prop. 
 br/cap nar/cap br/cap nar/cap cap excl br/cap nar/cap 
Dollar Growth 
Opt-Out 5,636 6,452 3,623 4,440 4,465 5,145 1,173 1,989 
Opt-In (6,592) (332) (5,430) 829 (1,153) (1,330) (5,439) 820 
Difference 12,228 6,785 9,054 3,611 5,617 6,475 6,612 1,169
P value (0.13) (0.40) (0.01)*** (0.08)* (0.47) (0.46) (0.02)** (0.48)
Percentage 
Growth 
Opt Out 48.03 113.48 113.87 125.39 50.44 50.44 75.10 95.83 
Opt In (5.91) 12.14 (19.37) (16.63) 18.80 18.80 (19.56) (15.36)
Difference 53.94 101.35 133.23 142.02 31.64 31.64 94.66 111.19 
P value 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.42 0.42 0.00 0.06
 
Note: all real values, 1996 dollars.  Panel D breaks down Panel C above.  It shows the dollar (and 
percentage) growth of states that opt out and do not opt out, and the difference between them. 
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Table 6: Effect of Opting Out on Level of Exemptions 
 
States < Federal Sates > Federal 
Homeowner Nonhomeowner Homeowner 
brd/cap nar/cap brd/cap nar/cap brd/cap nar/cap 
Optyr – 3 –0.595**
[0.247]
–0.910***
[0.268]
–0.057
[0.288]
–0.182
[0.602]
–0.076*
[0.036]
–0.006
[0.077]
Optyr – 2 –0.688***
[0.213]
–1.042***
[0.287]
–0.118
[0.482]
–0.901
[0.675]
–0.111
[0.087]
–0.143*
[0.070]
Optyr – 1 –0.679***
[0.193]
–1.030***
[0.268]
–0.255
[0.320]
–0.98
[0.616]
–0.111
[0.085]
–0.155**
[0.072]
Optyr –0.173
[0.121]
–0.224*
[0.123]
0.239
[0.177]
0.919**
[0.370]
–0.018
[0.065]
–0.059
[0.057]
Optyr + 1 –0.12
[0.082]
–0.164*
[0.089]
0.193*
[0.108]
0.661**
[0.264]
–0.036
[0.060]
–0.073
[0.056]
Optyr + 2 –0.057
[0.056]
–0.08
[0.064]
0.132**
[0.057]
0.421**
[0.179]
–0.034
[0.060]
–0.066
[0.059]
Optyr + 3 0
[0.033]
0.01
[0.026]
0.066
[0.043]
0.219*
[0.124]
–0.046
[0.059]
–0.075
[0.060]
Obs. 432 414 666 378 234 252
R-squared 0.93 0.9 0.82 0.96 0.99 0.99
F Test, optyr–1 = 
optyr 12.02 13.84 9.03 3.65 1.86 2.66
Prob > F 0 0 0 0.07 0.2 0.13
 
Note: dependent variables are exemptions (as indicated) divided into subsamples where states 
are less than federal exemptions as of 1978, and where states are greater than federal exemptions.  
Independent variables are years before and after opt out, with state and year fixed effects.   All 
values logged, real.   
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Figure 4: Effect of Opting Out on Level of Exemptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: x–axis shows years before and after opt out (t=0 for year of opt out).  All exemptions are 
real and logged.
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Table 7: Exemption Levels 
 
Panel A: Cross Sectional Regressions (1996) 
 Hstead, Cap Hstead, Excl. 
Unlim. 
Hown, Brd, 
Cap 
Nhown, Brd, 
Cap 
Hown, Brd, 
Cap, Fed 
Nhown, Brd, 
Cap, Fed 
History 1.264 
[0.000]*** 
1.156 
[0.000]*** 
0.238 
[0.079]* 
0.058 
[0.603] 
0.185 
[0.041]** 
0.042 
[0.604] 
Banks 0.214 
[0.743] 
–0.190 
[0.832] 
0.244 
[0.507] 
0.245 
[0.429] 
0.072 
[0.767] 
0.059 
[0.795] 
Cost of 
Living 
1.533 
[0.905] 
1.215 
[0.937] 
5.398 
[0.458] 
8.844 
[0.153] 
3.893 
[0.419] 
8.359 
[0.068]* 
Farmers –0.856 
[0.651] 
–0.509 
[0.822] 
–0.465 
[0.661] 
–0.117 
[0.895] 
–0.661 
[0.349] 
–0.400 
[0.542] 
Iincome per 
Capita 
–0.961 
[0.889] 
–0.174 
[0.984] 
0.143 
[0.971] 
–2.068 
[0.527] 
–0.621 
[0.809] 
–3.569 
[0.142] 
Population 
Density 
–0.393 
[0.493] 
–0.600 
[0.382] 
–0.396 
[0.223] 
–0.077 
[0.774] 
–0.330 
[0.127] 
–0.024 
[0.904] 
Divorce 
Rate 
0.393 
[0.839] 
–0.114 
[0.960] 
0.583 
[0.593] 
1.022 
[0.269] 
–0.253 
[0.726] 
–0.111 
[0.869] 
Ideology,  
1 – 5 
(liberal +) 
–0.269 
[0.540] 
–0.254 
[0.629] 
–0.256 
[0.301] 
0.031 
[0.879] 
–0.170 
[0.299] 
0.162 
[0.289] 
Gov 
Transfers 
–0.339 
[0.930] 
–1.073 
[0.807] 
0.008 
[0.997] 
–2.951 
[0.114] 
0.898 
[0.535] 
–2.308 
[0.093]* 
Charitable 
Giving 
–2.096 
[0.348] 
–2.630 
[0.314] 
–1.269 
[0.312] 
–1.040 
[0.324] 
–1.552 
[0.067]* 
–1.327 
[0.091]* 
Obs. 42 36 42 42 42 42 
R-Squared 0.675 0.655 0.362 0.236 0.378 0.387 
 
Note: p values in brackets; all exemptions logged and real; state and year fixed effects; 
exemptions are real and logged. 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Panel B: Pooled Regressions 
 Homestead, 
Cap 
Homeowner, 
Broad, Cap 
Nonhomeowner, 
Broad, Cap 
Homeowner, 
Broad, Cap, 
TBE 
Nonhomeowner, 
Federal 
Banks –0.546 
[0.077]* 
–0.128 
[0.269] 
0.031 
[0.899] 
–0.068 
[0.462] 
–0.175 
[0.169] 
Cost of Living 0.650 
[0.747] 
0.493 
[0.590] 
–1.865 
[0.499] 
1.458 
[0.156] 
1.452 
[0.166] 
Farm 
Population 
1.554 
[0.535] 
–1.382 
[0.128] 
0.055 
[0.986] 
–0.828 
[0.254] 
0.460 
[0.639] 
Income per 
Capita 
2.836 
[0.190] 
0.271 
[0.676] 
–0.998 
[0.534] 
–0.416 
[0.431] 
0.365 
[0.577] 
Population 
Density 
–1.667 
[0.299] 
–0.190 
[0.732] 
–0.779 
[0.518] 
0.582 
[0.312] 
–0.764 
[0.387] 
Divorce Rate –1.292 
[0.195] 
0.020 
[0.945] 
–0.463 
[0.639] 
0.146 
[0.726] 
0.401 
[0.319] 
Gov Transfers 4.923 
[0.069]* 
1.063 
[0.041]** 
1.612 
[0.168] 
0.578 
[0.226] 
0.352 
[0.467] 
Observations 1045 1045 1045 1045 1045 
R-Squared 0.923 0.919 0.643 0.935 0.723 
Robust p values in brackets; state and year fixed effects; see appendix for definitions of independent 
variables 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Panel C: Definitions of Independent Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Population Total population http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/state 
History Homestead exemption in 1920, 
logged 
Goodman, The Emergence of Homestead Exemption in 
the United States, p. 472 (cited in note __) 
Ideology Conservative (1) to liberal (5) Erickson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John 
McIver, 1993, Statehouse Democracy 
Banks Banks per 100K population, 
logged 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/index.html 
Bk Filing Bankruptcy filings per 10K 
population, logged 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 
Cost of 
Living 
Geographical cost of living 
index, by state, logged 
Source:  Walter McMahon, Geographical Cost of 
Living Differences:  An Update, AREUEA Journal, 
Vol. 19, No. 3, 1991, 426–450. 
Farm 
Population 
Farm proprietors per 100K 
population, logged 
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/reis/ 
Income per 
Capita 
Income per capita, real, logged http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/reis/ 
Population 
Density 
Population per square mile, 
logged 
Statistical Abstract  
Divorce Rate Divorces per 100K population, 
logged 
National Center for Health Statistics 
Gov Transfers Thousands of real dollars of total 
government transfers per capita, 
logged 
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/reis/ 
charitable 
giving 
Charitable donations divided by 
adjusted gross income in 1998, 
logged 
Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, The Urban 
Institute 
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APPENDIX: Summary statistics for selected variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Excl. Unlim. 928 29,310.02 36,238.27 0 200,000 
H
om
e
-te
ad
 
Cap For Unlim 1,100 54,555.73 71,064.95 0 281,513.50 
Brd, Excl 788 9,442.91 7,340.28 0 34,000 
Brd, Cap 1,100 17,095.47 17,854.35 0 105,571.20 
Nar, Excl 1,057 4,072.71 5,519.49 0 40,000 
Pe
rs
. P
ro
p.
 
Nar, Cap 1,100 4,600.35 5,937.27 0 33,813.07 
Brd, Excl 709 39,268.56 39,747.12 0 174,800 
Brd, Cap 1,100 71,593.92 78,460.59 0 387,084.70 
Nar, Excl 898 33,019.77 37,920.79 0 206,800 
Nar, Cap 1,100 59,098.81 73,049.91 0 315,326.60 
Brd, Excl, TBE 507 46,845.88 42,683.42 2,000 170,000 
Brd, Cap, TBE 1,100 115,993 93,661.43 2,000 387,084.70 
H
om
eo
w
ne
r 
Nar, Excl, TBE 898 33,089.92 37,897.09 0 206,800 
Brd, Excl 788 10,937.83 8,430.77 0 57,400 
Brd, Cap 1,100 18,401.01 18,234.05 0 105,571.20 
Nar, Excl 1,057 5,513.10 6,507.94 0 40,000 
Nar, Cap 1,100 6,006.26 6,772.60 0 36,400 
N
on
ho
m
e–
O
w
ne
r 
Brd, Cap, Fed, Real 1,100 45,586.50 19,314.93 23,022.60 81,567.34 
Gov Transfers 1,100 0.51 0.50 –0.74 1.63 
Banks 1,100 –9.83 0.90 –11.93 –8.10 
Cost of Living 1,100 4.68 0.12 4.48 5.10 
Divorce Rate 1,045 1.60 0.30 0.71 2.88 
Farm Population 1,100 –1.34 1.35 –5.83 0.81 
Charitable Giving 1,100 1.97 0.49 1.20 4.60 
Ideology 1,056 2.92 1.38 1 5 
Income per Capita 1,100 9.92 0.17 9.41 10.42 
Bankruptcy Filing 1,100 –6.52 0.76 –9.13 –4.71 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Population Density 1,100 4.24 1.44 –0.43 6.98 
 
Note: see Tables 2 and 7.C for variable definitions.  Some independent variables are real values or 
logged, as described there. 
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